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ARTICLES
CONSTITUTIONAL EQUAL PROTECTION,
STRICT SCRUTINY, AND THE POLITICS OF
MARRIAGE LAW
Anita K. Blair*
Many people today are amazed to hear anyone seriously contend that
the Constitution guarantees men and women the right to marry persons
of their same sex. But a member of Congress visiting here from the late
1860s would be astounded by more than that. When he and his col-
leagues passed the Civil Rights Amendments, they intended to make the
same constitutional rights then guaranteed to white citizens also apply to
newly freed slaves.2 Our visitor would be incredulous to learn that the
Fourteenth Amendment adopted in 1868 remains a vital and contentious
* Anita K. Blair, J.D., University of Virginia School of Law (1981), practices law in the
firm of Welty & Blair, P.C., in Arlington, Virginia. She also serves as Executive Vice
President and General Counsel of the Independent Women's Forum, a nonprofit, nonpar-
tisan policy organization. Ms. Blair wrote the amicus curiae briefs filed by the Independ-
ent Women's Forum in support of the State of Hawaii in Baehr v.Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394-
05 (on appeal, Haw. 1997), and in support of the Commonwealth of Virginia in United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (case involving the Virginia Military Institute
(VMI)). I will refer to this case in the text as "the VMI case."
1. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude in the
United States. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. The Fifteenth Amendment guarantees the
right of citizens to vote regardless of "race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Id
amend. XV. The Fourteenth Amendment consists of five sections. Sections 2, 3 and 4 re-
late to post-Civil War issues concerning voting rights and apportionment, qualifications to
hold federal offices, and validity of public debts. Id amend XIV, §§ 2-4. Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment defines U.S. and state citizenship to include "[a]ll persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof ...." It further
provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCrION OF THE LAW 36 (1990). "In a great burst of constitution-making prompted by
the Civil War, the nation from 1865 to 1870 adopted three major constitutional amend-
ments designed, primarily, to provide the recently freed slaves with the same civil and po-
litical rights as all free citizens." Id.
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force in U.S. law 130 years later--long after every one of the freed slaves
and former rebels intended to be dealt with by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment had passed from this earth.
Politically speaking, the idea that the Equal Protection Clause of sec-
tion 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment obliges states to license and recog-
nize homosexual marriages remains shocking and amazing to voters.
Polls show that nearly seventy percent of Americans believe states
should not sanction marriage between persons of the same sex.3 Since
1996, when the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was enacted,4
twenty-five states have passed laws banning same-sex marriage, and
eleven more were considering such legislation in early 1998.'
The democratic process seems unlikely to yield results that will favor
changing the traditional definition of marriage; however, the courts have
given some preliminary success to proponents of same-sex marriage. An
early victory in Hawaii6 established the formula-a mixture of law and
politics that requires abstracting the issue out of the usual democratic
process and subjecting it to strict judicial scrutiny under constitutional
equal protection.
I. EQUAL PROTECTION AND "STRICT SCRUTINY"
The Baehr v. Miike case concerned the equal protection clause of Ha-
waii's Constitution, which provides: "No person shall.., be denied the
equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the person's
civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of
race, religion, sex or ancestry."7 Similar language exists in the Four-
teenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and in many other state
constitutions.' Even so, and despite several previous challenges,' no
3. See Lisa Keen, Poll: Most Oppose Granting Licenses for Same-Sex Marriages,
WASH. BLADE, Apr. 12, 1996, at 19.
4. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738C (1996)).
5. See M. Jane Taylor, An ever-shifting landscape, WASH. BLADE, Feb. 13, 1998, at
1. State laws limiting marriage to one man and one woman enjoy substantial popular sup-
port. For example, when Washington State Governor Gary Locke vetoed such a bill at the
end of the 1997 session, proponents reintroduced, passed and overrode a second veto "at
lightning speed." Id.
6. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
7. HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 5 (1978).
8. Thirty-five states approved the Federal Equal Rights Amendment before the
time for ratification expired in 1982. Five later rescinded their approvals. See George F.
Will, Remember the ERA?, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1997, at A27.
9. See Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. App. 1995); DeSanto v.
Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct.
1232 [Vol. 47:1231
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other federal or state court had ever found a constitutionally protected
right to marry a person of the same sex. Instead, courts and agencies
presented with this question had uniformly determined that marriage
was legitimately limited to couples consisting of one man and one
woman.'
0
The Hawaii appeals court concluded that, based on its review of fed-
eral constitutional precedents, strict scrutiny applies to sex classifications.
In Baehr, the trial court applied a strict scrutiny standard and ruled that
Hawaii's law restricting marriage to heterosexual couples was an uncon-
stitutional denial of equal protection, because it improperly classified
persons based on their sex." Under the strict scrutiny standard enunci-
ated by the U.S. Supreme Court and adopted by the Hawaii Supreme
Court, the state was obliged to show that its marriage law was "narrowly
drawn" to serve a "compelling state interest [].12
The court reasoned that the Hawaii equal protection clause resembles
the Federal Equal Rights Amendment, 3 and therefore should be inter-
preted under the same standard that would have applied if the Federal
ERA had been adopted 4
At that time, the Hawaii court did not have the benefit of the Supreme
Court's 1996 decision in United States v. Virginia (the VMI case). 5 The
author of that opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, later candidly ad-
mitted that "there is no practical difference between what has evolved
and the ERA."'6 The VMI decision applies a standard of review that has
App. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810
(1972).
10. See David Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex Marriage? Baehr v. Miike and the Meaning
of Marriage, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1, 7-10 (1997).
11. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60.
12. Id. at 67.
13. The Federal ERA stated, "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged ... on account of sex." It was passed by Congress in 1971. Thirty-five (out of a
required minimum of thirty-eight) states eventually approved it; however, five rescinded
their approvals and five more were poised to do so when the time for ratification expired
in 1982. See Will, supra note 8.
14. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (plurality would have judi-
cially adopted the ERA, then pending before the states, and would have treated sex classi-
fications the same as race classifications, i.e., as suspect).
15. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
16. Anita K. Blair, How We Got the ERA, THE WOMEN'S QUARTERLY, Spring,
1997, at 6.
Among the most prominent advocates seeking adoption of the ERA by [judicial]
means was the head of the ACLU's Women's Rights Project at that time: Co-
lumbia Law School Professor Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Until her appointment as a
federal judge in 1980, Ginsburg herself briefed and even argued several of the
major Supreme Court cases in the 1970s dealing with sex classifications under the
1998] 1233
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come to be called "skeptical scrutiny." As applied, however, there is no
practical difference between "skeptical" and "strict" scrutiny. The U.S.
Supreme Court has insisted, rather, that constitutional equal protection
scrutiny, whether applied to race or sex or other classifications, must in-
volve a rigorous examination of the actual purposes and effects of the
laws or state actions under challenge.
Properly understood, strict scrutiny is not a measure of the quality or
desirability of legislative determinations, but a tool for discovering if they
are founded on irrational or improper assumptions.
Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegiti-
mate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursu-
ing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect
tool. The test also ensures that the means chosen "fit" this
compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility
that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial
prejudice or stereotype. 7
Contrary to lawyers' lore, even strict scrutiny is not "fatal in fact." As
the U.S. Supreme Court has recently reiterated, applying "strict scrutiny"
does not automatically invalidate every challenged classification, even
those involving race."8 Strict scrutiny does not create an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of unconstitutionality; by its own terms, it allows some limited
forms of legal discrimination. 9 Classifications subject to strict scrutiny
under the U.S. Constitution are those which, almost invariably, are com-
pletely irrelevant to any assessment of a person's capabilities or qualifica-
tions.0 Thus, classifications based on factors like race or national origin
are "strictly" scrutinized because it is highly likely that they are irrational
and unrelated to any proper purpose.
Properly applied, strict scrutiny illuminates false prejudices and stereo-
types, but does not ignore facts or obscure the truth. Regardless of the
applicable level of scrutiny, constitutional equal protection never re-
quires courts to disregard actual differences between persons. In the case
of race, mere superficial differences in skin color are irrelevant to ability;
in the case of sex, physical differences, if significant, may affect capacity.
Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at7.
17. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989).
18. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995).
19. For example, the use of affirmative action as a remedy for past racial discrimina-
tion is not prohibited, even by Adarand. See id.
20. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
("These factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest
that laws grounded in such considerations [as race, alienage, or national origin,] are
deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy ... ").
1234 [Vol. 47:1231
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Unlike race or national origin, sex manifests itself in inherent physical
differences that affect a person's actual capabilities. "Skeptical scrutiny,"
the current federal constitutional standard for examining sex classifica-
tions as articulated in the VMI case, forbids virtually all state laws or
state actions that distinguish between persons based solely on sex, with
only one exception: distinctions based on actual inherent physical differ-
ences between men and women.
Explaining why the U.S. Supreme Court continues to treat sex and
race differently, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, on behalf of a seven-
justice majority, wrote:
Supposed "inherent differences" are no longer accepted as a
ground for race or national origin classifications... See Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Physical differences between men
and women, however, are enduring: "WFhe two sexes are not
fungible; a community made up exclusively of one [sex] is dif-
ferent from a community composed of both." Ballard v. United
States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946).21
Thus, skeptical scrutiny differs from strict scrutiny only in name. In pur-
pose and effect, it yields identical results.
II. "STRICT SCRUTINY" MISAPPLIED IN THE BAEHR V. MIIKE CASE
In applying strict scrutiny to Hawaii's law restricting marriage to het-
erosexual couples, the Hawaii trial court assumed away any possibility
that the state ever could meet this burden. The trial court determined
that, because some children can survive without one or both of their
biological parents, the State may not take measures to assist and encour-
age biological parents to remain jointly present and responsible for the
upbringing of their own children." This in itself is an unreasonable as-
sumption. Equal protection does not forbid honest efforts to achieve a
better world merely because perfection is unattainable.
A. "Compelling Interest"
The circuit court found that the State in fact had demonstrated that
"[t]here is a public interest in the rights and well-being of children and
families. "3 Although children and families can survive under all sorts of
circumstances, some conditions have proven to be much more favorable
than others for the nurture of children and families. Traditional mar-
21. 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
22. See Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, [hereinafter Baehr].
23. Baehr, 1996 WL 694235, at *17.
1998] 1235
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riage, which binds one woman and one man to each other and to their
children, is not a perfect institution; it has many virtues, however, that
make it naturally superior, as a rule, to other possible arrangements for
promoting the welfare of children and families.
The virtues of marriage are that it aims to create an exclusive, perma-
nent bond between persons whose sexual activity may result in concep-
tion and birth. Not every male-female couple produces children; but
every child has two, and only two, biological parents, who always consist
of one man and one woman. Not all couples are faithful or stay together,
but marriage at least extracts the promise from both to be responsible to
each other and to their children. Human children (unlike other animals'
young) require years of care and attention before they are self-sufficient.
While examples abound of people who have selflessly raised others' chil-
dren, it remains generally true that of all possible candidates, the biologi-
cal parents are the persons most likely to be willing to invest their time in
the care of their own child. Traditional marriage is no insurance against
fate, but for thousands of years it successfully served society by providing
strong protection for the great majority of children, women and families.
The mere fact that children are sometimes raised in circumstances
without both biological parents does not mitigate society's compelling
interest in encouraging and protecting traditional heterosexual mar-
riage. 4 To legalize same-sex marriage is, as Manhattan Institute Fellow
and author David Frum recently wrote:
[to] endors[e] the conscious creation of families intended from
the beginning to be fatherless or motherless or both. To believe
in gay marriage, you have to be ready to accept that girls might
be raised by two men-and that it won't matter. You have to
be ready to accept that boys will be taken away from their fa-
thers, and led to manhood by two women-and that it won't
matter. You have to be ready to accept children being raised by
foursomes: Two men, two women who mutually impregnate
each other. (No, I'm not inventing this: Just such a family lives
in Vancouver, British Columbia, and was admiringly profiled by
Canada's Globe and Mail last year.) You have to be ready to
accept children being bought and sold like prize heifers as lesbi-
ans purchase semen from sperm banks and gay men rent wombs
from surrogate mothers. Gay marriage is maybe not the last
24. Conspicuously missing from the Baehr court's findings was a serious discussion of
children's rights and interest in knowing and living with their biological parents, as well as
the potentially staggering degree of confusion and suffering that accompanies the depar-
ture from traditional marriage norms. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113
(1989) ("The facts of this case are, we must hope, extraordinary.").
1236 [Vol. 47:1231
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step to the transformation of children into commodities. But
it's close to the last.2
The State's arguments in Baehr established that the vast majority of
children and families rely specifically on the very kind of rights and secu-
rity afforded by traditional marriage to protect their welfare. Assisting
and encouraging couples who engage in procreative sex to commit them-
selves exclusively and permanently to each other and their children is a
compelling interest of any society. Making the same advantages gener-
ally available to any and all pairs of persons nullifies the exclusive-and
impairs the permanent-nature of heterosexual marriage.
B. "Narrowly Drawn"
The plaintiffs-appellees in the Baehr case frankly admitted they were
seeking the full array of legal benefits associated with marriage' 6 In ex-
amining whether a law restricting marriage to male-female couples com-
plies with constitutional equal protection requirements, the issue arises
whether couples or groups of the same or mixed sexes should be entitled
to other various ancillary legal benefits. The answer to that question de-
pends on legislative determinations concerning those benefits.
For example, in 1996 the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed Colorado's
Amendment 2, which expressly forbade any state or local government
action to protect the status of persons based on their "homosexual, les-
bian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships." Justice
Anthony Kennedy, for the majority, wrote:
The Fourteenth Amendment's promise that no person shall be
denied the equal protection of the laws must co-exist with the
practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one pur-
pose or another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups
or persons. (citations omitted.) We have attempted to reconcile
the principle with the reality by stating that, if a law neither
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will
uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational
relation to some legitimate end. (citation omitted.)27
Unlike the Colorado referendum, Hawaii's marriage law at issue in
Baehr does not target any class of persons. It restricts marriage to man-
25. David Frum, Dispatches & Dialogues, SLATE (Mar. 17, 1997)
<http://www.slate.com/code/DDD/DDD.asp?file=GayMarriage&iMsg=3>.
26. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 50, 57-59 (Haw. 1993). The state-granted bene-
fits generally include tax advantages, public assistance, community property rights, dower
and inheritance rights, child custody and support, spousal privilege for confidential com-
munications, etc. See id. at 59.
27. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
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woman couples for the obvious reason that human reproduction occurs
only heterosexually. To be sure, some biological parents never choose to
marry, or else they divorce, depart, or die, sometimes leaving another to
care for the children. But marriages, even today, survive much more of-
ten than they fail."
In defining marriage as a contract between one man and one woman,
the legislature did not abridge any person's constitutional rights. There
is no absolute right to marry,29 and no unencumbered right to make inde-
pendent decisions regarding procreation.3" Attraction to one's own sex
(homosexuality) is not a proscribed or suspect legal classification.3 Sex
discrimination simply does not enter into Hawaii's marriage law: women
and men are treated precisely the same, and for reasons having to do
with "enduring" physical differences.32 Given the State's compelling in-
terest in protecting the rights and well-being of children and families, its
decision to establish a legal structure within which biological parents may
commit themselves exclusively and permanently to each other and their
children was narrowly tailored, rational, measured and appropriate.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE POLITICS OF MARRIAGE LAW
Even if Hawaii (or another state) were to legalize same-sex marriage,
it would not follow automatically that public benefits now associated
with marriage would be extended to same-sex couples. Decisions about
setting tax rates and funding insurance programs, welfare programs, and
the like must be made by the legislature on a sound fiscal basis. The leg-
islature of any state that legalized same-sex marriage might well deter-
mine that it is not financially feasible to expand the definition of mar-
riage while continuing to provide the same historical benefits to a larger
pool of beneficiaries.
Significantly, the federal government already has determined, through
the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),33 that it will use the traditional
definition of marriage in administering its laws.34 This will limit federal
28. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STAT. ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. tbl. 142-149
(1995).
29. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
30. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872
(1992).
31. See Evans, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986)).
32. See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text.
33. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 2419 [hereinafter DOMA].
34. See 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (West 1997) ("[T]he word 'Marriage' means only a legal union
between one man and one woman.").
1238 [Vol. 47:1231
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benefits for same-sex couples. DOMA also invokes the Full Faith and
Credit provision of Article IV, Section 1, of the U.S. Constitution to
permit states not to recognize the validity of same-sex marriages con-
tracted in other states.35
In Frontiero v. Richardson,36 when four members of the U.S. Supreme
Court moved to adopt the Equal Rights Amendment (which was then
before the states for ratification), Justice Powell would not join their
analysis, but wrote:
There are times when this Court, under our system, cannot
avoid a constitutional decision on issues which normally should
be resolved by the elected representatives of the people. But
democratic institutions are weakened, and confidence in the re-
straint of the Court is impaired, when we appear unnecessarily
to decide sensitive issues of broad social and political impor-
tance at the very time they are under consideration within the
31prescribed constitutional processes.
On a similarly controversial subject, abortion rights, Justice Scalia
wrote in dissent in Casey: "[B]y foreclosing all democratic outlet for the
deep passions this issue arouses, by banishing the issue from the political
forum that gives all participants, even the losers, the satisfaction of a fair
hearing and an honest fight,.., the Court merely prolongs and intensi-
fies the anguish."3
The Hawaii circuit court reached an unprecedented legal conclusion,
which, if upheld, will have widespread and unpredictable effects. If the
Hawaii Supreme Court upholds the ruling below, it will appear to fore-
close an important public debate. On the other hand, as members of the
U.S. Supreme Court have found, deference to the legislative and demo-
cratic process will improve public confidence in the judiciary and public
acceptance of the final legal result.
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION AND GENDER POLITICS
This is not the first time an interest group has turned to the courts to
achieve results denied by the democratic process. Consider the strategy
employed by feminists to achieve, at last, the enactment of the Federal
Equal Rights Amendment, without actually adding it to any printed copy
of the Constitution.
35. See 28 U.S.C.A § 1738C (West Supp. 1997).
36. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
37. Id. at 692.
38. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1001
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19981 1239
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The Federal ERA was first proposed in 1923 by suffragettes fresh from
their victory in obtaining adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment, which
had given women the right to vote.39 According to Betty Friedan, author
and co-founder of the National Organization for Women (NOW), the
ERA "had been bottled up in Congress for nearly fifty years." She, and
other NOW founders who considered Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act insufficient, wanted to call greater attention to the enforcement of
women's rights and so resurrected the dormant ERA in 1971.40
That same year, the Supreme Court decided Reed v. Reed.4 '1 This was
presented as an equal protection challenge to an Idaho probate law pro-
vision that whenever two equally entitled candidates applied for ap-
pointment as administrator of an estate, the man was preferred.42 Under
the equal protection analysis at that time, the applicable test was whether
treating applicants differently bore a "rational relationship" to a state in-
terest embodied in the statute.43 The State argued that the automatic
preference for men served to expedite estate proceedings, avoid the cost
of hearings and minimize intra-family disputes. 44 The Court rejected the
State's reasons and unanimously declared the law unconstitutional.45
Several aspects of Reed are noteworthy: first, the Court did not have to
decide this case; the Idaho legislature amended its probate code and
eliminated the provision in question some time before the decision was
rendered, thus the Court could have declared the case moot. 4 Second,
the alternatives to giving male candidates a preference (such as holding a
hearing in each case or selecting administrators by lot) would be expen-
sive, time-consuming, divisive, unfair or arbitrary - all factors a state leg-
islature should be entitled to consider. Finally, the law was enacted by a
legislature elected by women as well as men. Women, normally consti-
tuting more than half the adult population, are capable of electing legis-
lators who will represent their interests. Instead, the Supreme Court de-
cided to substitute its judgment about what is "rational" for the judgment
of the people (including the women) of Idaho.
Two years later in Frontiero v. Richardson,7 a divided court took up
39. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
40. BETrY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 387 (1984).
41. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
42. See id. at 73-74.
43. See id. at 76.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 76-77.
46. See id. at 74 n.4.
47. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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another equal protection case involving a Defense Department policy
requiring husbands of military women, in order to qualify for dependent
benefits, to show that they actually depended on their wives for more
than half their support. Again, despite many reasons in support of this
policy and against other alternatives, eight justices voted to invalidate it.
Four of them, anticipating passage of the ERA, said they would judge
sex classifications by the same standard as race classifications; the other
four would not go so far but agreed the reasons for the policy did not
constitute a rational basis for it.4
In the 1976 case of Craig v. Boren,49 at issue was the constitutionality of
an Oklahoma law prohibiting the sale of beer to males under twenty-one
and females under eighteen years old. The state argued that this law had
a rational basis because teenage boys are far more likely to drink, drive
and be involved in auto accidents than are teenage girls. This time the
Court abandoned the pretext that it was applying a rational basis test.
For sex (by this time called "gender")"0 classifications, the Court devised
a new standard, which came to be known as "intermediate scrutiny."
Intermediate scrutiny was less strict than the strict scrutiny standard
applied to racial classifications, but more strict than the rational basis
standard applied to everything else. To survive intermediate scrutiny, a
gender classification must be substantially related to the achievement of
an important governmental objective. Justice Rehnquist, in dissent,
identified the emerging conflict between self-government by the people
and ever-escalating levels of judicial scrutiny:
How is this Court to divine what objectives are important?... I
would have thought that, if this Court were to leave anything to
decision by the popularly elected branches of the Govern-
ment,... it would be the decision as to what governmental ob-
jectives to be achieved by law are "important," and which are
not."
By the time the ERA was declared dead in 1982, the intermediate
scrutiny standard for gender classifications was well established in consti-
tutional equal protection law. As ERA opponents had predicted, many
cases overturning popularly enacted laws actually came out adverse to
48. The four ERA supporters were Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall and White.
The other four were Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell and Stewart.
Justice Rehnquist dissented. See id. at 678, 682, 691.
49. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
50. See DALE O'LEARY, THE GENDER AGENDA, REDEFINING EQUALITY 89-94
(1997) (discussing the evolution of the term "gender" as a substitute for "sex" in legal and
political discourse).
51. Craig, 429 U.S. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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women's interests. An example is Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan,2 in which the Court ordered Mississippi's only all-female state
nursing school to admit men, even though men had access to other state-
supported nursing schools that were already co-ed." The people of Mis-
sissippi had erred in perpetuating the "stereotype" of nursing as a
women's profession.
Finally, in 1996 with the VM1 case, the Court declared that, in matters
involving gender, it would require "an exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion" for any state law or action to distinguish between men and
women.5 No justification may rely on "overbroad generalizations about
the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females,0
6
and any justification is deemed overbroad if any individual might prove
to be an exception to it.57 This test, by any name, is strict scrutiny. Thus,
the VMI case, as Justice Ginsburg admitted, represents the judicial en-
actment of the ERA, after the democratic process twice rejected it."
V. CONCLUSION
The great majority of Americans support traditional marriage and op-
pose efforts to legalize same-sex unions. Both the U.S. Congress and
state legislatures have enacted legislation reflecting this strong public
opinion.
Nevertheless, some courts have ignored the practical rationales behind
laws restricting marriage to heterosexual couples. These decisions seem
to be based on the belief that constitutional equal protection forbids le-
gal inequality - that is, it forbids legal distinctions between persons, and
legal generalizations that may be less than absolute.
The dual-track strategy (legislation and court action) now being pur-
sued by proponents of same-sex marriage has also been used in the past
successfully to overrule the political process. The legalization of same-sex
marriage, however accomplished, would pose a serious threat to our so-
ciety for many reasons.
52. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
53. See id. at 731.
54. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
55. Id. at 531.
56. Id. at 533.
57. There was no individual plaintiff in the VMI case. The Court's decision was
based in part on VMI's admission that theoretically some woman might be able to perform
the physical requirements imposed on male cadets. See id. at 523, 540-41.
58. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text. The original time for adoption of
the ERA was ten years, expiring in 1981, but Congress agreed to extend the deadline until
June 1982.
[Vol. 47:12311242
Strict Scrutiny and the Politics of Marriage
If, as seems possible, that result were accomplished through judicial
rather than legislative action, it would threaten the very foundation of
our constitutional government. Notions of "equality" such as would
support such a counter-democratic finding are based on the belief that
our basic law compels us to govern, if at all, only at the level of the lowest
common denominator. In a fundamental way, such radical equality
would devastate the quality of life in a democracy.
Toqueville foresaw the "species of oppression" that would result from
the loss (or abandonment) of citizens' right of self-government:
I seek to trace the novel features under which despotism may
appear in the world. The first thing that strikes the observation
is an innumerable multitude of men, all equal and alike, inces-
santly endeavoring to procure the petty and paltry pleasures
with which they glut their lives. Each of them, living apart, is as
a stranger to the fate of all the rest; his children and his private
friends constitute to him the whole of mankind ....
Above this race of men stands an immense and tutelary
power, which takes upon itself alone to secure their gratifica-
tions and to watch over their fate .... For their happiness such
a government willingly labors, but it chooses to be the sole
agent and the only arbiter of that happiness; it provides for their
necessities ... facilitates their pleasures, manages their principal
concerns, directs their industry, regulates the descent of prop-
erty, and subdivides their inheritances: what remains, but to
spare them all the care of thinking and all the trouble of living?
Thus it every day renders the exercise of the free agency of
man less useful and less frequent; it circumscribes the will
within a narrower range and gradually robs a man of all the uses
of himself. The principle of equality has prepared men for
these things; it has predisposed men to endure them and often
to look on them as benefits."
59. ALEXIS DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 318-19 (1945).
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